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Abstract
We evaluate the individual employment effects of four types of short-term training for
immigrants and natives in the German welfare system and identify differences in the
effects determined by unobservable factors. Based on comprehensive and unique
administrative data, we apply propensity score matching in a dynamic setting to
estimate the treatment effects and suggest the identification of unexplained effect
differences between groups. The results show a mixed picture: two types of training
increase the employment chances of immigrants, whereas the other two are rather
ineffective. Effect differences between immigrants and natives predominantly result
from socio-demographic composition.
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1 Introduction
Immigrants face a higher risk of unemployment and are more often dependent on
welfare benefits than natives in many countries. In Germany, their labor market situ-
ation is of particular concern.1 In 2011, more than every third welfare recipient was
an immigrant (36 percent, comprising first and second generation), while the corre-
sponding share in the population was less than 20 percent (Statistisches Bundesamt
2011). Persons claiming welfare benefits are forced to actively look for employment
and to enhance their employment chances. In order to improve the employability
of welfare recipients, German welfare agencies offer a number of active labor mar-
ket policy (ALMP) programs. Given the overrepresentation of immigrants in welfare,
this group can be perceived to have also a higher need of support by ALMP.2 Nev-
ertheless, relatively little is known so far about the impacts of ALMP programs for
immigrants. This lack of evidence is not specific for Germany. There are only a
few international studies that analyze ALMP programs with a particular focus on
immigrants.3
A reason for the scarce evidence may be the lack of ALMP programs specifically
designed to the needs of immigrants. In Germany, for example, with language courses
being the only exception, immigrants participate in programs that have been designed for
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all welfare recipients. Within Germany’s ALMP programs, so-called short-term training
programs have been widely used for native and immigrant welfare recipients. These pro-
grams last for a maximum of 3 months comprising aptitude tests, intensified counseling,
courses improving job search skills, and measures providing specific skills and abilities
required for employment. Programs’ content can be flexibly arranged according to the
individual’s needs. Participation should help to improve the employability by increasing
the search efficiency and improving productivity.
Similar programs are used in many other countries, usually referred to as job search
assistance programs. Leaving aside country-specific differences in labor market institu-
tions, detailed program characteristics, and enrolment rules, the overall picture of the
employment effects of these programs tend to be positive.4 Whether these programs
reach their purposes for immigrants (like for natives) is not clear ex ante and varying
impacts can occur for a number of reasons. Differences in placement may result from
a different value of the programs for immigrants compared to natives. If programs are
designed with respect to the needs of the average native welfare recipient, then they may
not work (well) for immigrants, and policy makers should think about redefinition of pro-
grams addressing the specific needs of immigrants. On the other hand, if programs are
particularly effective for immigrants even though not initially designed for this group,
policy makers may intensify the use.
We evaluate the effects of four short-term training programs on taking up employ-
ment for male native and immigrant welfare recipients in Germany. In particular, we try
to answer the following research questions: First, how effective are programs for immi-
grants (compared to natives)? And, second, if differences in effects are observable between
natives and immigrants, can we identify potential reasons of these differences? Deter-
mining the source of differences in program effectiveness between groups is important.
If, on the one hand, differences in program effectiveness are driven by differences in the
socio-demographic composition of native and immigrant welfare recipients, this implies
a general potential for welfare agencies to improve the targeting of programs to partici-
pants. If, on the other hand, differences are due to the immigrant characteristic, then this
points to other reasons, e.g. discrimination, and the use of programs for either immigrants
or natives should be reconsidered.
The empirical analysis is based on comprehensive register data of the inflows into wel-
fare in 2006. Individuals are followed until July 2008. Regarding the first question, we
estimate effects of participation in a short-term training program during the first year on
welfare using propensity scorematching estimators in a dynamic setting, where treatment
effects vary conditionally on the preceding duration in welfare. To answer the second
question, we decompose differences in treatment effects in observable and unobservable
components. To do so, we identify differences in treatment effects between natives and
immigrants that result from the attachment of the individual to the immigrant group
(immigrant fixed effect). The estimation is carried out with a matching estimator consid-
ering only treated individuals of both groups, where group attachment is the treatment
in question. To preview our results, the picture is mixed. On the one hand, courses pro-
viding skills and aptitude tests have positive effects on employment. These effects differ
only slightly between immigrants and natives once we control for observable differences
between both groups. On the other hand, job search training and combined programs are
ineffective irrespectively of migration background.
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents details of the German
welfare system and of the programs evaluated. The data used in the empirical analysis are
described in section 3. Section 4 discusses the evaluation approach. The empirical results
are presented in sections 5 and 6. The final section concludes.
2 Institutional framework and theoretical effects
The German welfare system was substantially reformed at the beginning of 2005 (see
e.g. Jacobi and Kluve 2007). In order to be eligible for welfare benefits, persons have to
be aged 15 to 64 years and be able to work for at least 15 hours per week since then.
According to the legal definitions, unemployed welfare recipients are persons who have
not been employed in the past and are not eligible for unemployment benefits and per-
sons who have exhausted their unemployment benefits claims.5 Unemployment is not a
prerequisite for receipt of welfare benefits, and employed individuals are also eligible if
the household income is too low. Claimants have to register with the local welfare agency
and are obliged to participate in ALMP programs. Placement in programs results upon
decisions of caseworkers regarding the needs of the welfare recipients. Most programs,
including short-term training, are exclusively targeted at unemployed welfare recipients.
Table 1 provides some selected numbers on the welfare system concerning the entitled
persons and the corresponding spending for the years 2005 to 2008 (the years from the
welfare reform in Germany to the horizon of our empirical analysis). As becomes obvious,
on average about 5 million people were entitled to welfare benefits. However, referring to
the years from 2006 onwards a slight decline from about 5.4 million to 5.0 million persons
could be established. The spending amounted to more than 30 billion Euro per year for
welfare benefits. Corresponding to the shift in the number of entitled persons, spending
declined slightly between 2006 and 2008. In contrast, the numbers for the spending on
ALMP emphasize the 2005 reform goal to activate all welfare recipients. Whereas in 2005
only 3.1 billion Euro were spent overall, this number increased by more than 50 percent
up to 4.7 billion Euro in 2008.
Within the scope of ALMP programs, short-term training programs are a quite fre-
quently used measure. During the years 2005 to 2008, between 411 and about 628
thousand welfare recipients per year have participated in these programs.6 Short-term
training programs consist of three different types of measures (modules) that can be
offered separately or in combination and allow a flexible implementation in line with the
specific needs of the welfare recipient and the options of the local welfare agency.7
The first type of courses are aptitude tests (Eignungsfeststellungen) which last for up
to four weeks. These tests are used to assess the suitability of participants in terms
of skills, capability, and labor market opportunities for specific occupations. During
the assessment process occupation specific skills are provided which shall help to
Table 1 The welfare system and short-term training programs
2005 2006 2007 2008
Persons entitled to welfare benefits (avg. annual stock)a 4,981,748 5,392,166 5,276,835 5,009,656
Spending for welfare benefits (in billion Euro)b 32.8 34.7 31.5 30.2
Spending for ALMP (overall, in billion Euro)b 3.1 3.8 4.2 4.7
New participants in short-term training programsa 410,900 533,634 519,783 627,739
aFigures obtained from Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009a).
bFigures obtained from Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2009b).
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improve employment chances in the respective occupations. At the same time, the
caseworker gets a better knowledge about the skills and labor market prospects of the
welfare recipient. This should increase the effectiveness and efficiency of his or her
placement efforts. The measures of the second type of short-term training programs
aim at improving the applicant’s presentation and job search abilities (Überprüfung der
Verfügbarkeit/Bewerbertraining). The activities support the individual’s efforts to find
work or efforts by the welfare agency to place him/her, especially through job-application
training, counseling on job search possibilities or measures assessing the person’s will-
ingness and ability to work (work-tests). Measures of the second type are promoted for
up to two weeks and will be referred to as job search training in this analysis. The third
type contains practical training of the participants (for up to eight weeks) providing nec-
essary skills and techniques required for placement in employment or vocational training
(Vermittlung notwendiger Kenntnisse und Fertigkeiten). The courses cover, for example,
specific working techniques like business administration or computer courses. We will
refer to this form of training as skill provision. Finally, combinations of modules, e.g. a
job aptitude test followed by a computer course, could be granted for a maximum of
twelve weeks. This is the fourth type of training considered here and will be referred to
as combined training programs. The modules can be flexibly arranged. In some cases,
combined training programs consist of two modules, while in other cases all three
modules are combined.
Financial support during the programs is provided by the Federal Employment Agency
(FEA) and covers course costs, examination fees, and travel grants as well as child care.
In addition, participants receive welfare payments. All short-term training programs are
intended to qualify welfare recipients for employment. There is no intention of a threat
effect, i.e. the assigned participants quit welfare in order to avoid participation. Assign-
ment to programs depends on the decision of the caseworker, who interviews and advises
the welfare recipient about requirements for and obstacles to employment. If this assess-
ment reveals the need for participation in a short-term training program, the caseworker
decides about the type offered, i.e. whether the welfare recipient should be trained in a
single or a combined program. In case of the latter, the number and the sequence of mod-
ules is defined ex ante. (Therefore, they can be assumed to constitute a distinct type of
program).
The institutional set-up of short-term training programs implies two channels through
which programs affect the job search of the participants and, therefore, the employment
chances. First, the modules that improve or support the job placement – on part of the
welfare agency or the self-contained job search of the participants – can be expected to
improve the search behavior of the participants by increasing the intensity as well as the
efficiency of the search efforts. More efficient job search will lead to an increase in the job
offer arrival rate, which increases the probability of leaving welfare. However, it will make
job seekers more selective with respect to potential job offers and induces a negative indi-
rect effect on the transition. The overall effect is then the sum of the positive direct and
the negative indirect effect. Second, participation in short-term training could improve
the job-relevant skills and therefore increase the job opportunities of the participants.
Increasing the skills is equivalent to increasing productivity which enables participants
to apply for jobs associated with on average higher wages. In terms of job search the-
ory this equals a shift of the wage offer distribution to the right. According to Mortensen
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(1986), an increase in the mean of the wage offer distribution increases the reservation
wage by an amount less than the increase in the mean, and, therefore, this will increase
the probability of leaving welfare as well.
These theoretical considerations imply positive effects of participation in a short-term
training program on the probability of taking up employment. However, for the theo-
retically derived positive effects to hold in reality there have to be potential employers
willing to engage the participants in the programs. Despite the increased search effort or
the higher productivity obtained in practical training, participants may still possess a pro-
ductivity too low to be remunerated by the market. In that case, there will be no positive
effects of participation.
3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on merged information of five different sources of admin-
istrative records provided by the FEA for a sample of inflows into welfare in Germany
between January, 1st 2006 and December, 31st 2006. The main source is the Integrated
Employment Biography data set (Integrierte Erwerbsbiographien, IEB). The information
included in IEB covers the years 1990 to 2007 on a daily basis and provides a detailed
characterization of the labor market histories and the current situation of the welfare
recipients, including information on participation in the four types of short-term train-
ing programs. To ensure that inflows in the data are not short-term recurrences of
welfare episodes, for example due to false reporting or data errors, only persons are
regarded who have not been registered in welfare for three months before the sam-
pling date. Since entitlement to welfare is means-tested with consideration of the wealth
and the income of further household members, we merge information on further per-
sons living in the households that are recorded in the Benefit History Master Records
(Leistungshistorikgrunddatei, BHMR).
In our analysis, we distinguish between immigrants and natives. Immigrants com-
prise all foreigners and naturalized persons. Foreigners are persons, who do not possess
German citizenship. The naturalized group contains German resettlers (from the former
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) and naturalized foreigners. Although citizenship is
recorded in IEB, identification of naturalized foreigners and German resettlers could only
be carried out partially from this dataset. To identify resettlers we consider information
on the immigration date recorded in the Job Seeker Statistics (Arbeitsuchendenstatistik,
ASU) dating back to 1990, which contains resettler status explicitly. To identify natu-
ralized foreigners, we use information from the IEB for the years 1990 to 2007 and in
addition the Employment History Records (Beschäftigtenhistorik, EHR) for the years 1975
to 1989. A person with German citizenship at the sampling date who was recorded being
a foreigner in any spell since 1975 is treated as a naturalized.8
Immigrants are not equally distributed across welfare districts in Germany. For exam-
ple, in East Germany the number of immigrants is far lower than in the West, and even
inWest Germany strong regional disparities can be observed with a higher concentration
of immigrants in cities and urban regions with industrial production. In contrast, rural
areas usually exhibit smaller numbers of immigrants. To consider the local labor mar-
ket conditions specific to the distribution of immigrants in the estimation of treatment
effects, the analysis sample was drawn in a 1:1 ratio of immigrants and native Germans
on regional level. In a first step, the sample of immigrants was randomly drawn from the
2013, 2:24
http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/24
Thomsen et al. IZA Journal of Migration Page 6 of 20
total inflow population into welfare in 2006. Then, in a second step, for each randomly
drawn immigrant from a welfare agency district, one native German was drawn from the
same district. Therefore, immigrant-native German ratios are balanced across districts
and should mitigate regional imbalances in the distribution of immigrants.9
For our analysis, we restrict the sample to male unemployed welfare recipients aged 18
to 57 years at the sampling date. Welfare recipients younger than 18 years are excluded
so that the estimates are not affected by compulsory schooling. Individuals aged 58 years
and above are eligible for so-called relaxed welfare receipt. Within this scheme active
job search is not required for benefit entitlement and claimants can rely on welfare until
(early) retirement age. The final sample for the analysis contains 50,815 observations of
which slightly more than half are natives (25,953) and the rest are immigrants (24,862).
We identify for each sampled person the first assigned program during the welfare spell
and evaluate participation in a short-term training program against nonparticipation in
any other program at the time of starting the program. Our outcome of interest is the
effect of short-term training on the drop-off rate fromwelfare conditional on employment
uptake of the individual, where employment comprises jobs subject to social security
contributions in Germany. The binary outcome variable can be observed on a monthly
basis until July 2008 and has been merged from the Employment Statistics Register
(Beschäftigtenstatistik, ESR).10 The spectrum of available independent variables in our
data comprises sociodemographic characteristics, details of the household composition
of the individual, aspects of qualification and experience, a comprehensive labor market
history, and regional information. Further information on the independent variables is
provided in section 5.1.
4 Evaluation approach
4.1 Estimation of treatment effects
The empirical analysis follows the potential outcome approach of causality, see e.g. Roy
(1951) or Rubin (1974). Using conventional notation, let Y 1 and Y 0 denote the two poten-
tial outcomes, where Y 1 is the outcome when the individual participates in the program,
and Y 0 is the outcome, when the individual does not participate. Since the individual can-
not be in both states at the same time, one of the potential outcomes is unobservable
and direct calculation of the treatment effect is impossible. To provide an estimate of the
counterfactual state, we use information of non-participants. We apply a matching esti-
mator with dynamic definition of participation and non-participation conditional on the
elapsed welfare duration to estimate the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT).
Conditioning on the elapsed welfare duration is sensible in the German context for a
reason emphasized by Sianesi (2004).11 In a comprehensive ALMP system a person will
join a program at some point, provided the individual remains in welfare long enough.
Consequently, the reason why an individual is not observed as participating in a program
is that the person has already left the welfare system, or the time horizon of the analy-
sis is too short. In line with that, participation and non-participation have to be defined
dynamically, i.e. with respect to the point in time in which the comparison is made. Per-
sons who have neither entered a program nor left welfare up to a specific point in time
are defined as non-participants of interest or ‘waiters’ (in the sense that they are waiting
to be allocated to a program). Thus, non-participation can be interpreted as the default
state for each individual, and everybody is a non-participant until entering a program or
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leaving to take up a job. Individuals who are defined as non-participants at the moment
we start our comparison may enter a program at a later point in time.
The evaluation approach in the dynamic setting could be formalized as follows. Let
U = {0, . . . ,Umax} define the discrete elapsed welfare duration of the individual since
registration at the local welfare agency. Furthermore, let u denote the point of time during
the welfare spell in which the program of interest starts and Du the treatment indicator
with the discrete time index: Du = 1 if the individual starts a program at time u of the
welfare spell, and Du = 0 if the individual remains on welfare at u. Program effects are
estimated for time t, i.e. the time since the program started. The hypothetical outcomes
for time t given a treatment at time u are then defined as Y 1t,u for individuals who received
the treatment at u and Y 0t,u for individuals who did not receive the treatment at least up
to time u. The parameter of interest for each u is the average effect in t for individuals
starting a program in period u of their welfare spell compared to not joining at u:
ATTt,u = E(Y 1t,u − Y 0t,u|Du = 1,D1 = · · ·Du−1 = 0)
= E(Y 1t,u|Du = 1,D1 = · · ·Du−1 = 0)
− E(Y 0t,u|Du = 1,D1 = · · ·Du−1 = 0). (1)
Whereas the first term is identified in the data by the observed outcome of the partici-
pants, the second term has to be estimated. Simply using the observable non-participants’
outcomes may lead to biased estimates due to self-selection. To solve the potential selec-
tion bias by matching, we have to assume conditional independence, i.e. conditional on
a set of relevant covariates X the non-participation outcome Y 0 is independent of the
participation decision. Instead of conditioning on single X, we use the propensity score
p(X) = E(D = 1|X), i.e. the probability of participation in a program (see Rosenbaum
and Rubin 1983). The propensity scores are estimated by probit models. For the dynamic
case, the dynamic conditional independence assumption (DCIA) is:
Y 0t,u  Du|p(Xu),D1 = · · · = Du−1 = 0, (2)
i.e. the hypothetical outcome at time t after not participating up to time u is independent
of program participation at time u, conditional on the propensity score p(Xu) measured
at time u. The DCIA ensures that treated and non-treated individuals are comparable
in their non-treatment outcomes at time t conditional on p(Xu), conditional on claim-
ing welfare benefits up to time u, and conditional on not receiving treatment before u.
In addition, the availability of non-participating analogues for the participants has to be
ensured (common support), i.e. Pr(D = 1|Xu) < 1 (Smith and Todd 2005a).
4.2 Estimation of the Immigrant Fixed Effect (IFE)
Considering effect heterogeneity in the treatment effects between immigrants and natives
for a particular program can be used to reveal important insights. Assuming that identical
programs are provided, differences could be, on the one hand, due to differences in the
composition of the groups, i.e. the distributions of the relevant characteristics for program
participation and labor market success may be different. Hence, when conditioning on
all these variables no further differences should remain. However, on the other hand, if
residual differences persist between groups, these differences are solely due to the group
attachment of the individual. In this case, programs do not work in the same way for
natives and immigrants with identical characteristics. Since we are interested in the effect
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difference due to the attachment to the immigrant group, we call this residual part the
immigrant fixed effect (IFE). Identifying the part of the effect difference that cannot be
explained by differences in sociodemographic composition is important for the targeting
of programs to welfare recipients. The heterogeneous value of an identical treatment may
result from a set of confounding factors associated with the attachment of the individual
to the immigrant or the native German group. To estimate the immigrant fixed effect, we
apply the following estimation procedure based on a matching estimator. To abbreviate
notation, we suppress the indicators of the dynamic setting.
Starting point of the analysis is the raw differential ATTDif in treatment effects between
immigrants and natives, that can be obtained by subtraction of the estimated treatment
effect for native Germans from the estimated treatment effect for immigrants:
ATTDif = ATTM=1 − ATTM=0, (3)
where M is a binary index indicating immigrants if M = 1 and native Germans other-
wise. The corresponding estimates for ATTM=1 for the immigrants and ATTM=0 for the native




Y 1M=1 − Y 0M=1|p(XM=1),D = 1,M = 1
)
, (4)
i.e. the estimated ATT for the immigrants conditional on the estimated propensity score
of this group, p(XM=1), and
ATTM=0 = E
(
Y 1M=0 − Y 0M=0|p(XM=0),D = 1,M = 0
)
, (5)
the analogue estimator of the ATT for the native Germans conditional on the propensity
score of this group, p(XM=0). For the sake of illustration, we have also added the group
attachment indicator to the potential outcomes within each group.
For the estimation of the IFE, we can also apply the potential outcome framework. The
treatment of interest is now the group attachment of the individual (whereM = 1 denotes
immigrants and M = 0 natives) and we are interested in the difference between two
potential treatment effects: The first is the expected treatment effect of training for immi-
grants with immigrant characteristics XM=1, E(Y 1M=1 − Y 0M=1|XM=1,D = 1,M = 1). The
counterfactual state refers to the hypothetical treatment effect of training for immigrants,
if they had the same expected labor market success as natives with identical immigrant
characteristics XM=1, i.e. E(Y 1M=0 − Y 0M=0|XM=1,D = 1,M = 1). The IFE is therefore
given by:
IFE = E(Y 1M=1 − Y 0M=1|XM=1,D = 1,M = 1) − E(Y 1M=0 − Y 0M=0|XM=1,D = 1,M = 1).
(6)
Since we consider treatment effects of short-term training as the hypothetical outcomes
in the identification of the IFE, we only consider participants as the population of interest.
Unfortunately, the second term on the right-hand side of Equation (6) cannot be estimated
directly from the data since the labor market outcomes of natives (Y 1M=0,Y 0M=0) are not
observed for the immigrants (M = 1).
To estimate Equation (6), we have to provide a proxy for the unobserved hypothetical
treatment effect of the immigrants. The estimated treatment effect of native participants
who are matched on all relevant labor market characteristics to immigrant participants in
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short-term training programs can serve as an approximation. Again, we use the advantage
of a balancing score to condense the information of the distribution of the XM=1 into
a single index function, b(XM=1). The estimation of this balancing score is arranged by
estimating a probit of being in the immigrant group, M = 1, on the comprehensive set
of available covariates used in the estimation of the treatment effects. By doing so, we
can resemble the counterfactual hypothetical treatment effects of the immigrants when
they were like native Germans. Conditional on the estimated balancing score, we have to
assume mean conditional independence of the expected treatment effect of natives from
immigrant status, i.e.
E(Y 1M=0 − Y 0M=0)  M|b(XM=1),D = 1. (7)
If assumption (7) holds, we can replace the second term on the right-hand side in
Equation (6) with the estimated treatment effect of natives possessing the observable
characteristics of the immigrants:
E(Y 1M=0 − Y 0M=0|b(XM=1),D = 1,M = 1) = E(Y 1M=0 − Y 0M=0|b(XM=1),D = 1,M = 0).
(8)
5 Estimated employment effects
5.1 Implementation and quality of the estimates
For the estimation of program effects we stratify our data by migration background and
quarter of program start. Since short-term training usually is assigned early during a wel-
fare spell, the number of treated observations declines over time. This is in particular true
for job search training, which – due to its content – is mainly used in the first quarter of a
welfare spell. As the numbers of treated individuals in this and the other forms of training
become too small in later quarters for estimation, we concentrate our analysis on quar-
ters with a sufficient number of participants. In total, we estimate treatment effects for 28
different strata.
For the propensity scores, we have estimated separate probit models for each group,
each treatment, and for up to the first four quarters of the welfare spell. Each model esti-
mates the probability of starting a program in quarter u, conditional on X, conditional on
having reached the welfare duration of u ∈ {1, . . . , 4} quarters, and conditional on not
having received a treatment before u in the welfare spell. Explanatory variables regarded
cover sociodemographic characteristics, details of the household composition of the indi-
vidual, aspects of qualification and experience, a comprehensive labor market history,
and regional information. We consider the age of the individual in four classes (18 to
24 years, 25 to 34 years, 35 to 49 years, and above 50 years) and whether the person is
married or lives in cohabitation. Details of the household composition cover the number
of welfare recipients (like spouses or partners), the number of welfare recipients under
age 18, number of persons who are not able to work, and the number of children under
age 15 living in the household. In addition, we consider the total size of the household
that can include further persons not dependent on welfare. The (formal) qualification is
given by the degree of schooling (no schooling, basic schooling, intermediate schooling,
professional schooling, and higher secondary schooling providing a university entrance
qualification) and the occupational training the person possesses (no occupational train-
ing, basic occ. training, intermediate occ. training, university of applied sciences degree,
2013, 2:24
http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/24
Thomsen et al. IZA Journal of Migration Page 10 of 20
university degree). Regional information is regarded by dummies for the sixteen federal
states in Germany and a dummy for East Germany.
The individual labor market history is considered for up to 72 months (6 years)
before (potential) program participation. The characterization takes account of episodes
of employment, unemployment, searching for a job, participation in ALMP programs,
and out of the labor force. To enable incorporation in the empirical models, informa-
tion is aggregated in a first transformation into six-months intervals by summing up
the number of 14-day spells in the respective intervals. Since spells are defined in 14-
day episodes, a possible limitation of this transformation is that two spells are weighted
equally independently of whether they occurred subsequently or were interrupted. A
second transformation, therefore, counts the number of non-interrupted spells within
six-months intervals. In a third transformation, the average durations in the five labor
market states during the last six months and last 24 months prior to (potential) program
participation are regarded. A fourth transformation normalized the relative time spent
in the different states over six-months intervals. In addition to the detailed labor market
history, a dummy variable indicates that the person has not been employed in any form
(full-time or part-time employment subject to social insurance contributions or minor
employment) during the years 2001 to 2005.
We distinguish the available information into 22 blocks of variables. The specifications
of the final models used in the estimations were obtained by starting with the full set
of variables and a stepwise dropping of jointly insignificant variable-blocks (indicated
by F-tests) in order to provide a parsimonious specification.The exact specifications of
the estimated 28 propensity score models cannot be presented here. Results reveal, that
especially age, educational attainment, vocational qualification, household composition,
region, and employment history within the last two years before (potential) program par-
ticipation are relevant factors that must be accounted for when estimating the effects of
short-term training programs.
Valid estimation of treatment effects requires, that the covariates included in the
propensity score are balanced between treatment and comparison group after matching.
To check this, we applied a procedure suggested by Smith and Todd (2005b):
Xku = β0 + β1 pˆ(Xu) + β2 pˆ(Xu)2 + β3 pˆ(Xu)3 + β4 pˆ(Xu)4
+ β5 D + β6 Dpˆ(Xu) + β7 Dpˆ(Xu)2 + β8 Dpˆ(Xu)3 + β9 Dpˆ(Xu)4. (9)
Equation (9) was estimated for each variableXku included in the propensity score of pro-
gram participation in quarter u. Afterwards, the null hypothesis of β5 to β9 being jointly
zero was tested. The test indicates, whether there are differences due to the treatment
indicator conditional on a quartic polynomial of the propensity score. If ideal balancing
is achieved all those coefficients should be zero. The test is passed in 95% or 1,387 of
1,460 cases at the 1% significance level (see Table 2). Thus, balancing quality is high and
sufficient to obtain valid treatment effects.
To ensure common support in each estimation sample, we delete all treated individuals
whose propensity score is smaller than the smallest or larger than the largest propensity
score in the respective group of non-treated individuals. As can be seen from Table 3, in
most cases all treated individuals are on support.
The outcome, drop-off from welfare conditional on employment uptake, is measured
monthly from the first month of the sequent quarter after (potential) participation
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Table 2 Balancing test for the estimation of treatment effectsa,b
p > .1 p > .05 p > .01 #
Aptitude tests
Quarter 1
Natives 28 31 35 37
Immigrants 66 70 72 74
Quarter 2
Natives 50 54 56 58
Immigrants 36 36 38 40
Quarter 3
Natives 36 37 38 38
Immigrants 66 67 68 74
Quarter 4
Natives 30 31 33 35
Immigrants 45 48 53 55
Job search training
Quarter 1
Natives 58 61 63 65
Immigrants 51 54 59 66
Quarter 2
Natives 41 42 45 46
Immigrants 73 74 77 80
Quarter 3
Natives 23 24 24 26
Immigrants / / / /
Quarter 4
Natives / / / /
Immigrants / / / /
Skill provision
Quarter 1
Natives 48 51 52 54
Immigrants 55 55 60 62
Quarter 2
Natives 33 36 37 42
Immigrants 34 35 37 39
Quarter 3
Natives 57 58 61 68
Immigrants 32 32 32 33
Quarter 4
Natives 45 49 52 55
Immigrants 53 56 58 59
Combined training programs
Quarter 1
Natives 51 55 56 62
Immigrants 76 77 80 83
Quarter 2
Natives 50 53 54 57
Immigrants 43 43 44 44
Quarter 3
Natives 34 36 37 38
Immigrants 27 28 28 31
Quarter 4
Natives 36 36 38 39
Immigrants / / / /
aFigures denote number of regressors for which the balancing test was passed on the respective significance level indicated
by column. The number of regressors included in the respective propensity score specification is presented in column #.
b/ indicates that the number of treated individuals in the respective cell was too low to estimate treatment effects.
onwards for up to twelve months.12 The treatment effects are estimated using kernel den-
sity matching applying the algorithm provided by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). Standard
errors are calculated by bootstrapping with 250 replications.
5.2 Estimation results
Table 4 shows the estimated ATTs for participants starting one of the four short-term
training programs during the first year on welfare. The results indicate, that aptitude
tests have a positive impact on the probability of natives and immigrants to take up
employment. This positive impact does not depend on the exact timing of the training.
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Table 3 Common support condition for the estimation of treatment effectsa
Aptitude tests Job search training Skill provision Comb. training programs
Quarter 1
Natives 507/507 303/303 288/288 410/410
Immigrants 448/448 270/270 244/245 360/360
Quarter 2
Natives 260/260 116/116 160/160 180/180
Immigrants 213/213 110/110 146/146 157/157
Quarter 3
Natives 138/140 48/48 94/94 90/90
Immigrants 143/143 - 82/82 96/96
Quarter 4
Natives 91/92 - 69/69 63/63
Immigrants 98/98 - 67/67 -
aRemarks: Displayed is the fraction of treated individuals satisfying the common support condition on all treated individuals
in the respective sample. On support are those individuals, whose propensity score is not smaller than the smallest and not
larger than the largest propensity score in the respective group of non-treated individuals. Treated observations, who are off
support, are not used in the matching analysis to estimate treatment effects.
However, the absolute size and the significance of the effects differ across quarters and
also between the two considered groups. For programs starting in the first quarter of
welfare receipt, we observe larger treatment effects for natives than for immigrants. One
year after starting the program, the ATT for natives amounts to 9.4 percentage points,
whereas the corresponding value for immigrants is 6.5 percentage points. The effects one
year after program start are substantial when compared to the overall outflow rate from
welfare at this point in time. On average, 25 percent of the natives leave the welfare sys-
temwithin 15months after inflow. For immigrants we observe an outflow rate of about 20
percent.
In contrast to the first quarter, for aptitude tests starting in the second and third quarter
we observe, that treatment effects are larger for immigrants than for natives. During the
whole observation period, the estimated effect for immigrants amounts to more than 10
percentage points, whereas the corresponding estimate for natives ranges between 6.4 and
9.7 percentage points. In the fourth quarter, the picture is again reversed. We now find
large treatment effects with a magnitude of more than 15 percentage points for natives,
while the effect for immigrants amounts to about 10 percentage points.
Compared to aptitude tests, job search training is rather ineffective. We estimate
insignificant employment effects for natives in all considered quarters. For immigrants
the estimated effects are also insignificant in the second and third quarter. Only in the
first quarter, we find significantly positive effects at the end of the observation period.
Nine months after starting the program, the average effect amounts to 6.4 percentage
points. Thereafter, however, the effect declines to about 4 percentage points one year after
program start.
Contrary to job search training, skill provision seems to be more effective. For natives
who start training in the first quarter of the welfare spell, we observe positive employment
effects. The training increases the probability of participants to take up a job and to leave
the welfare system by more than 10 percentage points in the second half of the obser-
vation period. For immigrants we also observe positive employment effects. However,
compared to natives effects are smaller in magnitude and only slightly significant. One
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Table 4 Estimated ATTa
Aptitude tests Job search training
3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12
Quarter 1 Treated: 507 natives and 448 immigr. Treated: 303 natives and 270 immigr.
Natives
0.0668 0.0867 0.0834 0.0939 -0.0123 0.0307 0.0224 0.0329
3.76 4.42 4.04 4.61 -0.65 1.24 0.93 1.24
Immigrants
0.0464 0.0441 0.0703 0.0653 -0.0014 0.0193 0.0637 0.0414
2.66 2.44 3.55 3.06 -0.08 0.85 2.69 1.77
Quarter 2 Treated: 260 natives and 213 immigr. Treated: 116 natives and 110 immigr.
Natives
0.0965 0.0848 0.0760 0.0947 -0.0073 0.0191 -0.0045 0.0026
3.88 3.26 2.84 3.46 -0.24 0.57 -0.13 0.07
Immigrants
0.1007 0.1032 0.1129 0.1020 0.0034 -0.0323 0.0126 0.0193
3.77 3.73 3.69 3.30 0.12 -1.14 0.33 0.47
Quarter 3 Treated: 138 natives and 143 immigr. Treated: 48 natives
Natives
0.0815 0.0889 0.0640 - -0.0399 -0.0120 0.0191 -
2.43 2.51 1.86 - -1.03 -0.25 0.35 -
Immigrants
0.1033 0.1279 0.1566 - / / / -
3.17 4.02 4.32 - / / / -
Quarter 4 Treated: 91 natives and 98 immigr.
Natives
0.1532 0.1857 - - / / - -
3.24 3.71 - - / / - -
Immigrants
0.1085 0.0943 - - / / - -
2.95 2.49 - - / / - -
Skill Provision Combined Training
3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12
Quarter 1 Treated: 288 natives and 244 immigr. Treated: 410 natives and 360 immigr.
Natives
0.0430 0.0764 0.1192 0.1026 0.0045 0.0306 0.0293 0.0289
1.83 2.72 4.23 3.60 0.28 1.52 1.39 1.38
Immigrants
0.0218 0.0497 0.0522 0.0617 0.0069 0.0316 0.0208 0.0272
0.96 1.89 1.87 2.09 0.38 1.47 1.01 1.21
Quarter 2 Treated: 160 natives and 146 immigr. Treated: 180 natives and 157 immigr.
Natives
0.0157 0.0380 0.0308 -0.0029 0.0207 0.0089 0.0374 0.0379
0.57 1.15 0.93 -0.08 0.75 0.31 1.15 1.07
Immigrants
-0.0096 0.0332 -0.0084 0.0032 0.0082 0.0271 0.0054 0.0519
-0.42 1.15 -0.29 0.10 0.31 0.94 0.18 1.57
Quarter 3 Treated: 94 natives and 82 immigr. Treated: 90 natives and 96 immigr.
Natives
0.0124 -0.0115 -0.0016 - -0.0250 -0.0262 -0.0355 -
0.36 -0.32 -0.04 - -0.89 -0.76 -0.98 -
Immigrants
0.0213 0.0527 0.0998 - 0.0154 0.0588 0.0744 -
0.59 1.21 2.19 - 0.50 1.48 1.70 -
Quarter 4 Treated: 69 natives and 67 immigr. Treated: 63 natives
Natives
0.0722 0.0688 - - -0.0407 -0.0108 - -
1.59 1.44 - - -1.31 -0.24 - -
Immigrants
0.1028 0.0563 - - / / - -
2.29 1.29 - - / / - -
aRemarks: Displayed are average treatment effects on the treated for the respective month after treatment start and
corresponding t-values. Standard errors have been obtained through bootstrapping based on 250 replications. Fields
marked by a - indicate that no outcome variable could be observed for the respective month. Fields marked by a / indicate
that the number of treated individuals in the respective cell was too low to estimate treatment effects.
2013, 2:24
http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/24
Thomsen et al. IZA Journal of Migration Page 14 of 20
year after program start the probability to find a job is increased by 6 percentage points. In
the remaining quarters, employment effects aremostly insignificant for natives and immi-
grants. Only for immigrants participating in the third quarter, we observe increasingly
positive effects during the observation period.
Even though some training modules show a positive impact on the probability to take
up employment, the combination of two or three modules in one program is rather inef-
fective. For natives we find no significant effect, irrespective of the quarter considered. A
similar picture arises for immigrants for the first and second quarter. In the third quarter
we find increasingly positive employment effects for this group during the observation
period albeit the degree of statistical significance is low. Nine months after program start
the estimated effect amounts to 7.4 percentage points, but the effect is significant only at
the 10% level.
Overall, the results indicate that aptitude tests work best both for natives and immi-
grants, irrespective of the timing of treatment. When applied early during the welfare
spell, skill provision is helpful for welfare recipients, too. Job search training and
combined training programs are rather ineffective. Aptitude tests and skill provision
are programs that have a direct focus on employment uptake. They aim at increas-
ing qualifications demanded by the labor market. Aptitude tests, for example, include
the screening of participants’ potential to work in occupations looked for by employ-
ers and the teaching of skills relevant in these occupations. Therefore, aptitude tests
improve the matching quality between participants and open jobs. Skill provision also
aims at increasing qualifications demanded by employers. However, the focus of skill
provision is more general than in the case of aptitude tests. It involves mainly quali-
fications that are not occupation-specific but are basic requirements for employment
uptake in many occupations (e.g. computer courses). In contrast to aptitude tests and
skill provision, job search training does not provide a direct path to employment. It
can be seen as a preparatory program for employment uptake. The program helps to
get in touch with employers, but does not provide specific skills required by them.
This might explain the disappointing employment effects of this program. A com-
bination of job search training with skill provision or aptitude tests might be more
effective.
The fact that we do not find positive employment effects for combined training pro-
grams can have two potential reasons. First, in our data we are not able to differentiate
which programs are combined. There might be effective and ineffective combinations
which overlap and drive our estimation results to get insignificant. Second, there seems
to be a particular selection into combined programs. Caseworkers assign the program in
particular to welfare recipients with multiple disadvantages and adverse labor market his-
tories. The combined training programs may not be sufficient to address and overcome
these problems.
Our results add to the evaluation literature of training programs by showing that there
can be considerable effect heterogeneity between different training modules. The over-
all picture in the literature indicates modestly positive employment effects of short-term
training (see e.g. Kluve 2010, and Card et al. 2010). The same is true for our results. Yet,
looking at different training modules reveals that some modules are more effective than
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6 Estimated IFEs
6.1 Implementation and quality of the estimates
For the estimation of the IFEs, we follow a matching protocol similar to the one used
for the estimation of treatment effects above. Based on the estimated ATTs for natives
and immigrants for the four considered short-term training programs starting in the first
quarter of the welfare spell, we have calculated the expected treatment effects on the
individual level and have kept only the information of the participants.13 Based on these
samples, we have then estimated the balancing scores for the likelihood of being mem-
ber of the immigrant group incorporating all available information in the data. For the
specification of the balancing score we applied the same selection procedure of the rel-
evant variables using F-tests and the Smith-Todd-balancing test afterwards to support
the inclusion of the single variables in the balancing score. Treated natives with bal-
ancing scores identical to the scores of the treated immigrants were matched to treated
immigrants, where kernel density matching was applied weighting the matched partners
according to the distance in balancing scores. Standard errors were calculated by boot-
strapping with 250 replications. The resulting effect gives us the average difference in
program effects between immigrants and natives which is due to the IFE keeping all
observable characteristics constant.
In the specifications of the balancing score models for the estimation of the IFEs, we
use on average more covariates than we used for the separate estimation of the treat-
ment effects of short-term training for immigrants and natives. Nevertheless, it turns
out again that especially age, educational attainment, vocational qualification, household
composition, region, and employment history within the last two years before (poten-
tial) program participation should be accounted for in these models. Table 5 shows that
covariates are balanced very well and that matching quality is of the same high degree as
in the first matching step. It has to be noted though, that the share of persons, who are
not on common support and are excluded from the analysis, is larger as in the estimation
of treatment effects. It varies between 4.2 percent (aptitude tests) and 13.0 percent (job
search training).
6.2 Estimation results
Section 5.2 showed that the treatment effects of the considered training programs differ to
some extent between natives and immigrants. Therefore, the question arises what might
cause these differences. Are they due to differences in the observable characteristics of
the two groups or are they due to unobservable differences subsumed in the immigrant
Table 5 Balancing test for the estimation of IFEsa and common supportb
p > .1 p > .05 p > .01 # CS
Aptitude tests 50 53 57 57 429/448
Job search training 63 64 68 69 235/270
Skill provision 43 44 46 47 233/244
Combined programs 44 46 48 50 333/360
aFigures denote number of regressors for which the balancing test was passed on the respective significance level indicated
by column. The number of regressors included in the respective propensity score specification is presented in column #.
bColumn CS displays the fraction of treated immigrants satisfying the common support condition on all treated immigrants
in the respective sample. On support are those immigrants, whose propensity score is not smaller than the smallest and not
larger than the largest propensity score in the respective group of treated native Germans. Treated immigrants, who are off
support, are not used in the decomposition analysis.
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fixed effect? To answer this question, we estimate the IFE and Table 6 displays the cor-
responding results. The first row of each block in the table depicts the raw differential
of differences in the ATTs between immigrants and natives for the respective program.
This raw differential is calculated from the results presented in section 5.2. The p-value
denotes statistical significance of the difference in ATTs of natives and immigrants. One
can see that raw differentials are relatively small andmostly statistically insignificant. This
implies that short-term training programs have on average a similar effect on both natives
and immigrants.
We are, however, more concerned whether the programs have similar effect on compa-
rable immigrants and natives. For this, we need to look at the magnitude and significance
of the IFE. The third row of each block in the table is denoted by IFE and shows the
estimated part of the raw differential which is due to the IFE. In other words, the IFE
indicates by how much the treatment effect of a program is changed due to the migra-
tion background holding all other factors fixed. The IFE of 0.014 for aptitude tests
three months after program start, for example, means, that participating immigrants
have on average a 1.4 percentage points larger treatment effect than native participants
with identical socio-demographic characteristics. Therefore, immigrants tend to benefit
more from aptitude tests than natives holding all other characteristics constant. How-
ever, this immigrant fixed effect is not statistically significant at the conventional levels
as can be seen from the p-value. Six months after program start, we observe a simi-
lar picture. The IFE is positive but insignificant. During the following months, the IFE
Table 6 Differences in treatment effects between natives and immigrantsa
3 6 9 12
Aptitude tests
ATTDif -0.020 -0.043 -0.013 -0.029
p-value 0.413 0.119 0.649 0.339
IFE 0.014 0.017 0.064 0.030
p-value 0.684 0.620 0.065 0.453
Job search training
ATTDif 0.011 -0.011 0.041 0.009
p-value 0.685 0.729 0.246 0.818
IFE 0.004 -0.004 0.024 -0.032
p-value 0.930 0.949 0.721 0.648
Skill provision
ATTDif -0.021 -0.027 -0.067 -0.041
p-value 0.503 0.468 0.087 0.310
IFE 0.011 0.023 -0.078 -0.059
p-value 0.816 0.634 0.144 0.324
Combined training programs
ATTDif 0.002 0.001 -0.009 -0.002
p-value 0.921 0.971 0.775 0.958
IFE 0.001 -0.028 -0.019 -0.039
p-value 0.970 0.556 0.696 0.454
aRemarks: ATTDif denotes the mean difference in the ATTs between immigrants and native Germans for the respective program
and month after program start. The p-values in the second row of each block derive from t-tests on the equality of the ATTs in the
group of natives and immigrants. IFE denotes the estimated difference in the ATTs for immigrants and native Germans that is
solely due to unobservable differences between the two ethnic groups. The p-values in the final line of each block denote
significance of these IFEs. Standard errors have been obtained through bootstrapping based on 250 replications.
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increases and reaches a maximum of 6.4 percentage points nine months after program
start. In this month, the effect is statistically significant at the 10% level. At the end of
the observation period, the IFE decreases to about 3 percentage points and lacks statisti-
cal significance again. When looking at job search training, skill provision, and combined
training programs, we do not estimate statistically significant IFEs. For all three programs,
the IFE tends to be negative at the end of the observation period. In absolute terms, it
is largest for skill provision and nearly identical for job search training and combined
programs.
The absence of significant IFEs indicates that there are no differences in the effec-
tiveness of training programs between natives and immigrants with otherwise identical
characteristics. Vice versa, differences in the employment effects arise because of dif-
ferences in observable socio-demographic variables like, for example, age or educational
achievement. Thus, there seems to be a general potential for caseworkers to improve the
targeting of programs at participants. The optimal assignment of programs is, however,
beyond the scope of this paper.
7 Conclusion
Based on comprehensive administrative data providing rich and unique information on
immigrant and native welfare recipients in Germany, we have evaluated the effects of four
different short-term training programs on the exit-rate fromwelfare by take up of employ-
ment and have identified differences in the treatment effects between both groups. To
take account of differences due to the timing of the intervention during the welfare spell,
we have applied a propensity score matching estimator in the dynamic setting. After-
wards, we have estimated the part of the effect difference between immigrants and natives
that results from group attachment solely (immigrant fixed effect). It determines differ-
ences in employment chances of participants with and without migration background
that cannot be explained by differences in composition.
The estimation results of the treatment effects exhibit substantial effect heterogeneity.
Participation in aptitude tests results in positive employment effects for both immi-
grants and natives. Skill provision is valuable for employment when provided early. Job
search training and combined programs, in contrast, are ineffective. Thus, programs
enhancing occupation-specific knowledge are more effective than programs focusing on
qualifications which are not of direct use for potential employers.
Our estimates of the immigrant fixed effect do not indicate significant differences in
treatment effects between immigrants and natives beyond observable characteristics.
These results reveal a general potential for welfare agencies to improve the overall use of
programs and the targeting of programs at participants based on observable characteris-
tics. On the other hand, they show that there is scope for improvement in the activation
of immigrant welfare recipients. Assignment of immigrants to job search training and
combined training programs should be reconsidered. The use of aptitude tests and skill
provision at an early stage of the welfare spell should be extended. An adjustment of acti-
vation into this direction can contribute to reduce the still high number of immigrant
welfare recipients in Germany.
Endnotes
1 See OECD (2008,2012) for a comprehensive description of the situation.
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2 Possible reasons for this over-representation can be different (un)employment
dynamics of immigrants compared to natives, i.e. immigrants may be more likely to stay
unemployed or less likely to stay employed. Uhlendorff and Zimmermann (forthcoming)
show that the first reason provides the relevant explanation, and immigrants need more
time to find a job. Nevertheless, employment stability does not differ between
immigrants and natives. This is a further argument for the expected higher need of
support of welfare recipients to get employed.
3 Clausen et al. (2009) evaluate the effects of ALMP programs on the hazard rate into
regular employment for newly arrived immigrants in Denmark. The programs are part
of the integration policies specifically designed for facilitating the labor-market
integration of newly arrived immigrants (introduced in 1999). In addition,
Cohen-Goldner and Eckstein (2010) evaluate a government provided training program
for highly-skilled female immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Israel.
Heinesen et al. (2013) investigate the employment effects of ALMP programs for
non-western immigrants in the Danish welfare system. Butschek and Walter (2013)
provide an overview of the effectiveness of ALMP programs targeted at immigrants in
European countries. See also Rinne (2013) for a comprehensive overview on the
evaluation of immigration policies (including the evaluation of ALMP programs.)
4 Besides others, job search assistance programs have been evaluated by Crépon et al.
(2005) for France, by Blundell et al. (2004) for England, by Graversen and van Ours
(2008) for Denmark. For Germany, evaluations have been provided by Hujer et al. (2006)
or Wolff and Jozwiack (2007). Thomsen (2009b) provides a detailed synopsis on the
effects of these programs from empirical studies for nine European countries.
5 Welfare recipients differ in their composition from short-term unemployed persons.
See Thomsen (2009a) for an analysis of differences in employability between
unemployed persons and welfare recipients in Germany considering a comprehensive
spectrum of socio-demographic information.
6 Short-term training programs were introduced for unemployment benefits recipients
in Germany in 1997/1998. In 2005, welfare benefit recipients became eligible to
participate in the programs, too. Since 2009, short-term training programs are subsumed
in the group of “programs of activation and vocational integration” (MaSSnahmen zur
Aktivierung und beruflichen Eingliederung) in Book III of the German Social Code.
7 Short-term training programs can be provided on-the-job within firms and
off-the-job. If provided off-the-job, activities are conducted by specialized service
providers (Bildungsträger). Evaluation of the treatment effects of on-the-job courses
may be complicated due to potential windfall gains of the supporting employers that
have to be considered. For this reason, we concentrate the analysis on off-the-job courses
only.
8 Unfortunately, the administrative records of the FEA contain neither information
about the place of birth nor about the parents of the individual. Moreover, since minors
(persons under 15 years of age) do not appear in any of these data sources, we cannot
identify immigrants who were naturalized at an early age and cannot distinguish first
and second generation immigrants.
9 The native Germans reflect a regional-identically distributed sample of immigrant
welfare recipients, but do not reflect a random sample of native German welfare
recipients.
10 Data for the analysis were extracted in February 2009. Due to delays in reporting by
employers, our observation period ends in July 2008.
11 Recent empirical literature highlights, that the starting point of the program within
the individual welfare spell may be an important determinant for the selection of
participating individuals, as well as for the type of program the individual is assigned to,
see e.g. Abbring and van den Berg (2003), Fredriksson and Johansson (2008), Hujer and
Thomsen (2010), Thomsen (2007), or Thomsen and Walter (2010).
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12 For programs assigned in the third or fourth quarter of the welfare spell, the
observation period is less than 12 months due to the time horizon of our data. It
amounts to 9 and 6 months, respectively.
13 We only estimate the immigrant fixed effects for the first quarter, since in the other
quarters the number of program participants is too small.
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